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PROTECTING TRIBAL SKIES: WHY INDIAN TRIBES
POSSESS THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
TRIBAL AIRSPACE
William M. Haney*
Abstract
Since the advent of human flight, lawmakers in the United States have
struggled to keep pace with advancements in aviation technology.
Similarly, many doctrines of federal Indian law that govern the exercise of
the sovereign powers of Indian tribes in the United States are based on
outmoded conceptions of the capabilities and interests of Indian people and
tribal governments. For decades, tribal governments have worked to
protect their sovereign interests in tribal territory from the effects of
aviation activities that occur within tribal airspace. There has been no
exploration of tribal airspace issues in the academic community and limited
examination of the subject in federal courts. As the Federal Aviation
Administration creates a regulatory framework for the operation of
unmanned aircraft systems in U.S. airspace, the question of tribal
sovereignty in tribal airspace remains highly relevant to tribal
governments, federal authorities, and aviation enthusiasts.
This Article argues Indian tribes possess the sovereign authority to
regulate tribal airspace. It examines the real-world interests that motivate
the exercise of tribal sovereignty in airspace and addresses potential
concerns and objections to federal recognition of that power. It proposes
political and regulatory solutions to the uncertain status of the ability of
tribes to regulate tribal airspace and argues that a cooperative relationship
between Indian tribes and the federal government is necessary to protect
tribal interests and the integrity of domestic aviation activities.

* William M. Haney is a Staff Attorney for the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians
and the Treasurer of the California Indian Law Association. Mr. Haney is a graduate of the
UCLA School of Law and is licensed to practice law in the state of California. During law
school, Mr. Haney was a Staff Member and Associate Editor of the UCLA Law Review and
served as Secretary and Alumni Chair of the UCLA Native American Law Students
Association. His practice areas include tribal governance, economic development,
environmental law, intellectual property, employment, real estate, the Indian Child Welfare
Act, and the protection and promotion of tribal sovereignty. Mr. Haney is an enrolled
member of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.

1

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

2

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 3
II. Airspace Regulation and Private Rights in Airspace .............................. 7
A. International Airspace Law ............................................................... 7
B. Domestic Airspace Regulation in the United States ........................... 9
1. Controlled Airspace..................................................................... 11
2. Uncontrolled Airspace ................................................................. 12
3. Special Use Airspace ................................................................... 12
4. Other Airspace ............................................................................ 14
5. FAA Treatment of Tribal Airspace .............................................. 14
C. The Airspace Rights of Landowners in the United States................. 15
D. State Regulation of State Airspace .................................................. 17
E. Tribal Regulation of Tribal Airspace ............................................... 18
III. A Review of Tribal Sovereignty Under Federal Law .......................... 20
A. Tribal Sovereignty .......................................................................... 20
1. The Marshall Trilogy................................................................... 20
2. Tribal Self Governance................................................................ 22
3. Reserved Rights and Implicit Divestiture ..................................... 23
4. Tribal Power to Exclude Non-Members ....................................... 24
B. Tribal Property Rights .................................................................... 24
C. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction .................................................................. 27
IV. Arguments for the Assertion of Jurisdiction in Airspace by Indian
Tribes ...................................................................................................... 28
A. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty ............................................................ 28
B. Tribal Power to Exclude Non-Members .......................................... 30
V. Objections to Tribal Sovereignty in Airspace ...................................... 33
A. Objection 1: Tribal Sovereignty in Airspace Is Preempted by
Federal Law ........................................................................................ 33
B. Objection 2: Tribes Have Been Implicitly Divested of Sovereignty
in Airspace .......................................................................................... 34
C. Objection 3: Tribes Do Not Have Regulatory Jurisdiction Over
Non-Member Pilots ............................................................................. 34
VI. A Proposal for Federal Acknowledgment of Tribal Sovereignty
in Airspace .............................................................................................. 35
A. Proposed Congressional Affirmation of Tribal Sovereignty
in Tribal Airspace................................................................................ 36
B. Proposed Federal Aviation Regulations ........................................... 37
VII. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 39

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol40/iss1/1

No. 1]

AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TRIBAL AIRSPACE

3

I. Introduction
A central maxim of international aviation law is that a nation state is
entitled to “complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its
territory.” 1 For countries that exist in the international community as
independent sovereigns, 2 the boundaries of each state’s sovereign airspace
are more or less delineated through international agreements. 3 Even those
nations that elect to assert sovereignty over national skies through domestic
declarations and regulations, rather than participation in international
airspace agreements, are generally acknowledged by the international
community to possess exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. 4
The unique sovereign status of Indian tribes in the United States
complicates an analysis of this doctrine as it applies to sovereign control
over tribal airspace. Although tribes exist as extraconstitutional, selfgoverning entities, they are also subject to the plenary power of the United
States and are regarded as “domestic dependent nations” under federal law. 5
This political reality necessarily informs the question of whether the
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes extends into the airspace above tribal
1. Paris Convention for the Regulation of Air Navigation, art. I, Belg.-Bol.-Braz.Czech-Gr.Brit.-China-Cuba-Ecuador-Fr.-Greece-Guat.-Haiti-Hedjaz-Hond.-It.-Japan-Liber.Nicar.-Pan.-Peru-Pol.-Port.-Rom.-Serb.-Siam-Uru.-U.S., Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
2. “Independent sovereign” in this instance means a nation state recognized by the
international community as capable of entering into international treaties with other nation
states.
3. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 1 (designating the airspace above signatory
countries to be the sovereign domain of each respective state). A country may also enter into
an air services agreement in which it allows airlines from other countries to fly through its
sovereign airspace, subject to certain limitations. For example, the International Air Services
Transit Agreement of 1944 grants the airlines of the 121 signatory countries the “‘First and
Second Freedoms’ of the air: that is, the right to fly across their respective territories without
landing, and to land there for ‘non-traffic purposes’, such as refueling or repairs.” ANTHONY
AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (2d ed. 2010). Countries may also enter into
bilateral or ad hoc agreements with each other to define the acceptable boundaries of the use
of sovereign airspace by foreign aircraft. Id.
4. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. I, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] (affirming the principle that “every State
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”).
5. The history of Indian tribes in America is a story characterized by continuous
struggles over the boundaries of tribal sovereignty, tribal jurisdiction, and tribal property
rights. These three issues have become inextricably linked in the canon of federal Indian law
and are essential to figuring out the puzzle of whether tribes have the right to assert
sovereign jurisdiction over tribal airspace. See infra Part III.
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land. This question is becoming relevant for those tribes faced with an
increasing use of tribal airspace.
The Hualapai Tribe (the “Tribe”) is a federally-recognized Indian tribe
situated on a reservation that encompasses more than one million acres and
includes much of the western rim of the Grand Canyon. 6 The Tribe earns
revenue in part by selling hunting and fishing permits, leading guided tours
of the Colorado River, conducting helicopter air tours over portions of the
Grand Canyon, and offering other recreational activities in the area. 7 The
Tribe’s reliance on tourism to provide revenue for the tribal government
necessarily requires strict control over the use and exploitation of its
resources by non-tribal members. 8 The extent and nature of the Hualapai’s
control over their own resources was tested in January 2009, when a nonIndian freelance tour guide and photographer named Lionel de Antoni flew
a fan-powered paraglider over the Hualapai reservation without the Tribe’s
permission. 9
As part of his freelance tourism business, Mr. de Antoni would regularly
fly over scenic public lands with a paraglider and take photographs of the
terrain below. 10 He would post the photos to his personal website and
organize tours of the areas that attracted the most interest from visitors to
his website. 11 Mr. de Antoni’s flight through Hualapai airspace began on

6. About Hualapai, HUALAPAI TRIBE, http://hualapai-nsn.gov/about-2/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2015).
7. Id. The Tribe also owns and operates a private airport and a public airport on its
reservation. The Hualapai Tribe’s public airport is essential to its tourist economy as it is the
departure and landing point for most of the air traffic moving through the reservation’s
airspace. See 3AZ5: Hualapai Airport, AIRNAV.COM, http://www.airnav.com/airport/3AZ5
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (providing information and flight guidelines regarding the
tribally owned private airport on the Hualapai Reservation); 1G4: Grand Canyon West
Airport, AIRNAV.COM, http://www.airnav.com/airport/1G4 (last visited Dec. 28, 2012)
(providing information and flight guidelines regarding the tribally owned public airport on
the Hualapai Reservation).
8. See About Hualapai, supra note 6 (“There is no casino gaming on the Hualapai
Reservation. . . . The principal economic activities are tourism, cattle ranching, and arts and
crafts.”).
9. Cyndy Cole, Hualapai, Pilot at Stalemate, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://azdailysun.com/news/hualapai-pilot-at-stalemate/article_f17b9b9c-9ceb-53e5-b6ebaa5524193aea.html [hereinafter Cole, Stalemate].
10. Id.
11. Tribal Airspace Dispute Deserves Quick Resolution, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Feb. 19,
2009),
http://azdailysun.com/news/opinion/tribal-airspace-dispute-deserves-quick-resolu
tion/article_f11717ed-5998-5e5f-a59a-a076890a57c6.html.
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federal land adjacent to the reservation, where he lived in a motorhome. 12
Hualapai officers met Mr. de Antoni near his landing site on the adjacent
federal land and confiscated his motorhome, paraglider, and camera
equipment. 13 The Tribe alleged Mr. de Antoni did not notify it of his intent
to fly in Hualapai airspace prior to his flight. 14 He insisted he did not make
physical contact with Hualapai land at any time during the flight and
pointed out that he landed on federal—not tribal—land at the conclusion of
the flight. 15
The ensuing dispute between the Hualapai Tribe and Mr. de Antoni
seemed certain to raise a set of interesting legal questions. A central point
of discussion that quickly emerged was whether the Hualapai Tribe has
jurisdictional authority to impose sanctions on pilots who enter reservation
airspace without prior authorization from the Tribe. Paul Charlton, an
attorney representing the Hualapai Tribe in the case, stated plainly that the
Hualapai Tribe has “the right to determine who will or will not fly over
Hualapai territory.” 16 A spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) initially told a reporter that “[a] tribe has no authority over
airspace and cannot charge people for using it,” but did not elaborate on the
legal basis for this claim other than to assert “[t]he federal government has
sole jurisdiction over the nation's airspace.” 17 Mr. de Antoni echoed this
sentiment and insisted his flight path complied with flight maps provided
by the FAA. 18 The FAA declined to further comment on Mr. de Antoni’s
case or intervene on his behalf. 19 Despite the early legal posturing by the
parties, Mr. de Antoni declined to wage a costly legal battle to argue his
theory of the case in tribal and federal courts. 20 He instead paid a fine to the

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Cole, Stalemate, supra note 9.
Cyndy Cole, In Citing Pilot, Tribe Lays Claim to Airspace Over Its Lands, ARIZ.
DAILY SUN (Jan. 21, 2009), http://azdailysun.com/news/in-citing-pilot-tribe-lays-claim-toairspace-over-its/article_a259f1d0-4718-5b01-ab8e-48feaee5f2d6.html [hereinafter Cole,
Citing Pilot].
16. Cole, Stalemate, supra note 9.
17. Cole, Citing Pilot, supra note 15.
18. Cole, Stalemate, supra note 9; Tribal Airspace Dispute Deserves Quick Resolution,
supra note 11.
19. Janice Wood, Hualapai “Trespass” Pilot Reluctantly Enters Plea, GEN. AVIATION
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.generalaviationnews.com/2009/03/16/hualapai-trespasspilot-reluctantly-enters-plea/.
20. Id.
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Hualapai Tribe and the Tribe returned his property. 21 Thus, while the Tribe
and Mr. de Antoni began to argue their cases in the court of public opinion,
the question of tribal control of airspace ultimately escaped judicial
analysis. 22
This Article introduces the issues that might have been involved in that
analysis and is intended to stimulate discussion about the legal basis for
tribal regulation of airspace. It argues that Indian tribes have inherent
sovereign jurisdiction over tribal airspace on the basis of established
principles of inherent tribal sovereignty and federal Indian law. 23 It
examines objections that tribes might encounter in attempting to exert
increased regulatory control over tribal airspace and proposes a legislative
solution to the more problematic obstacles that tribes face in this area of
law.
Part I examines basic international, federal, state, and tribal regulatory
airspace laws. It describes the legal basis for national control of airspace,
the history and extent of federal regulation of airspace in the United States,
the limited extent to which states in the U.S. may regulate state airspace,
and the laws of several Indian tribes that assert tribal jurisdiction over their
airspace.
Part II introduces the federal Indian law doctrines that limit the exercise
of tribal sovereign powers and defines how Indian tribes exist and operate
within and outside of the federal system. It provides an overview of the
unique sovereign status of Indian tribes, civil and criminal jurisdiction on
tribal lands, and tribal property rights.
Part III argues tribes have an inherent sovereign right to regulate tribal
airspace. It explores the idea that this right arises from the federallyrecognized inherent power of Indian tribes to exclude non-tribal members
21. Id.
22. There has been very little litigation over issues of tribal airspace in tribal, federal, or
state courts to date.
23. While the principles of inherent tribal sovereignty might be enough to explain the
basis of an Indian tribe’s essential jurisdiction over the airspace above its land, that
jurisdiction should also be justified using the canon of federal Indian law that has developed
over the past two centuries. This is because while jurisdictional issues can first be litigated in
tribal courts, non-Indian citizens of the United States also have subsequent recourse in the
federal courts under established constitutional and federal Indian law. See Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-57 (1985). The asserted plenary
power of the United States over Indian affairs has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in
such a way as to practically require that any expansions of tribal jurisdiction either be
explicitly acknowledged by Congress or sanctioned by existing federal acknowledgments of
tribal power over non-Indians and non-member Indians. See infra Parts IV-V.
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from tribal lands, and that this power has not been relinquished by Indian
tribes or abrogated by the United States government. It further proposes that
the right of tribes to regulate airspace is supported by the tribal power to
regulate non-members (including non-Indians) to protect its general health
and welfare.
Part IV addresses objections to and arguments against the recognition of
tribal sovereignty in airspace, including arguments that (1) tribal regulation
of airspace is preempted by federal aviation laws and regulations, (2) the
status of tribes as domestic dependent nations under federal law implicitly
divests them of authority to regulate airspace, (3) allowing tribes to regulate
airspace would be unsafe, and (4) tribes lack regulatory jurisdiction over
non-Indian, non-member pilots.
Part V of this Article proposes a legislative solution to the legal issues
involved in tribal jurisdiction in airspace. The proposed legislation would
explicitly recognize the power of tribes to regulate certain reaches of tribal
airspace as a cooperative effort with the FAA. It would also direct the FAA
to enact regulations to protect tribal airspace, up to an altitude of ten
thousand feet, from incursion by non-tribally operated aircraft without
permission from the affected tribe. Part V also proposes general regulatory
guidelines the FAA could adopt to carry out the congressional mandate. 24
II. Airspace Regulation and Private Rights in Airspace
A. International Airspace Law
The first known aviation law was enacted by French authorities on April
23, 1784. 25 The ordinance prohibited any person from taking a manned
balloon flight in the city of Paris without first obtaining permission from the
city’s police department. 26 Since that time, governments around the world
have struggled to craft laws that keep pace with relatively rapid
developments in aviation technology. 27 Though the use of airspace in the
24. It is beyond the scope of this Article to propose an entire body of regulations that
the FAA may adopt to carry out the goal of protecting tribal airspace. The agency oversees a
complex regulatory process that requires the input of government officials, aviation
professionals, and others who may be affected by a change in regulations. Thus, this Article
seeks only to provide a starting point from which the FAA might begin the process of
working with tribes to protect tribal airspace.
25. P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE : A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 4 (2003).
26. Id.
27. This tension can be seen clearly in the current debate in the United States over the
use of unmanned aircraft systems (also known as “drones”) within domestic airspace. See
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United States is regulated primarily through domestic laws and
regulations, 28 the global reach of air travel eventually led to the creation of
international agreements governing flight across international boundaries. 29
The use of aircraft in World War I resulted in the first international
agreements governing the exercise of sovereignty in national airspace. 30
Nations affected by the war realized the reach of military aircraft created a
need for clear rules governing the use of the airspace above their
territories. 31 The primary issue was whether navigable airspace should be
freely available to all, regardless of sovereign claims to the land below, or
whether individual nations should retain some sovereign prerogative over
national airspace. 32 Ultimately, signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty
agreed that all nation states—whether parties to the treaty or not—possess
sovereign rights to the airspace above national lands and territorial waters. 33
Although the default international rule is that nation states possess
sovereign rights to national airspace, those rights can be modified through
entrance into multi- or bilateral treaties. 34 There are limits, however, to the
airspace any country can lay claim to or modify in these agreements. For
example, the airspace above the “high seas”—the seas where all nations
may freely travel—is considered free of any individual national sovereign
control, and thus aircraft from all countries may freely pass through that
Trent Gillies, Drones Are Good, yet Safety Is ‘Paramount’: Former FAA Chief, CNBC
(Mar. 22, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102522833 (describing concerns with
the use of commercial drones in U.S. airspace); Ryan Mac & Frank Bi, Senator Cory Booker
to Introduce Commercial Drone Legislation Following FAA's Amazon Ruling, FORBES.COM
(Mar. 23, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/03/23/senator-corybooker-to-introduce-commercial-drone-legislation-following-faa-amazon-ruling/ (describing
a potential legislative effort to establish temporary rules governing the commercial use of
drones in U.S. airspace); Brian Montopoli, Lawmakers Move to Limit Domestic Drones,
CBS NEWS (May 16, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_16257584695/lawmakers-move-to-limit-domestic-drones/ (describing state and federal
legislation created in response to the plans of government and law enforcement agencies to
begin using drones in domestic United States airspace).
28. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-50105 (2015); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-1399 (2015).
29. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 1; Chicago Convention, supra note 4.
30. HAANAPPEL, supra note 25, at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Haanappel’s definition of a sovereign nation will suffice for the purposes of this
Article. He states that there are three primary characteristics of a modern sovereign state: “a
territory, a population living on such territory, and a government that effectively exercises
authority over the population living on the territory.” Id. at 3 n.13.
34. Id. at 15.
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airspace. 35 The boundaries of outer space are also similarly free of any
individual claims of national sovereign control. 36
Indian tribes in the United States are unlikely to rely solely on
international principles of aviation law when making the case for tribal
sovereignty in airspace because international law principles do not
generally apply in the context of federal Indian law. 37 Additionally,
although tribes are considered sovereign governments, the Supreme Court
and Congress have long regarded that sovereignty as being limited in many
important ways by the plenary power of Congress. 38 Thus, any discussion
of sovereignty in tribal airspace must necessarily acknowledge aspects of
both domestic aviation law and federal Indian law.
B. Domestic Airspace Regulation in the United States
Aviation law in the United States was largely developed in the twentieth
century as a way to ensure a safe and efficient national air transit system. 39
The fundamental principle of domestic aviation law is that the federal
government maintains sovereign control and supremacy over all airspace
above land within the boundaries of the United States. 40 The United States
was not a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Regulation of Air
Navigation in 1919, 41 but instead declared its sovereignty over national
airspace through the Air Commerce Act of 1926. 42 The Act was the result
of a congressional debate about whether the federal government has the
power to regulate the use of all airspace within the United States. 43
Congress’s primary concern at the time was that inconsistent state
aviation regulations—which originally governed flights through domestic

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1751 (2003) (discussing the federal government’s reluctance to apply
principles of international law to Indian law issues, and arguing that it should).
38. See infra Part III.
39. See A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (last modified Feb. 19, 2015,
4:23 PM), https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (describing the history of
aviation law in the United States).
40. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012) (“The United States Government
has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”).
41. HAANAPPEL, supra note 25.
42. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 40103.
43. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE
FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 150-67 (2008).
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airspace—would lead to unsafe air travel conditions. 44 While some
lawmakers initially argued that a declaration of federal supremacy over
aviation regulations would require a Constitutional amendment, 45 Congress
eventually concluded that the Constitution justified federal regulation of all
aviation activities in the United States. 46
Congress expanded federal regulation of aviation in the United States
with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“Aviation Act”).
Created in response to a series of domestic airplane accidents, 47 the purpose
of the Aviation Act is to “provide for the regulation and promotion of civil
aviation in such manner as to best foster its development and safety, and to
provide for the safe and efficient use of the airspace by both civil and
military aircraft.” 48 The Act created the precursor agency 49 to the FAA, the
federal agency responsible for the promulgation and enforcement of
aviation regulations in the United States. 50 The FAA’s mission is “to
provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.” 51 It
manages all air traffic and aviation activities within the United States
through a regulatory regime that spans five volumes in the Code of Federal
Regulations. 52
Airspace in the United States is broadly divided into regulatory airspace
and nonregulatory airspace. 53 Regulatory airspace includes controlled
44. Id. at 161.
45. Id. at 155-58.
46. Id. at 157-61. While the conclusion that federal regulation of interstate flights was
justified under the Commerce Clause was fairly straightforward, “[t]he question of intrastate
air travel was much harder.” Id. at 158. Around the time of the debate, the Supreme Court
decided two cases in which it concluded that federal regulation of railroads and stockyards—
even when purely intrastate—was justified under the Commerce Clause. Thus, Congress
concluded that federal regulation of intrastate aviation could be justified under the same
rationale. Id. at 159-61.
47. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 39.
48. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 731.
49. The initial governmental body responsible for aviation safety was the Federal
Aviation Agency, the Administrator of which was authorized to “develop plans for and
formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable airspace[,] and assign by rule,
regulation, or order the use of the navigable airspace . . . in order to insure the safety of
aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace.” Id. § 307(a), 72 Stat. at 749.
50. See A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 39.
51. Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Apr. 23, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www.faa.gov/
about/mission/.
52. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-1399 (2015).
53. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL: OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
BASIC FLIGHT INFORMATION AND ATC PROCEDURES ch. 3-1-1(a) (2014), http://www.
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airspace (Classes A, B, C, D & E) and restricted and prohibited areas. 54
Nonregulatory airspace includes military operations areas, warning areas,
alert areas, and controlled firing areas. 55
In placing airspace into a particular regulatory classification, the FAA
considers factors such as the complexity or density of aircraft movements in
the area, the nature of aviation operations conducted in the airspace, any
safety concerns unique to the area, and how national and public interests
might be affected by the classification. 56 There are three primary categories
of regulatory airspace: (1) controlled airspace, (2) uncontrolled airspace,
and (3) special use airspace. 57
1. Controlled Airspace
Airspace is “controlled” where pilots are required to communicate with
nearby air traffic control systems as they move through the area. 58 FAA
regulations separate controlled airspace into five classes: A, B, C, D & E. 59
Class A is “airspace from 18,000 feet [mean sea level (“MSL”)] up to
and including FL [flight level] 600, including the airspace overlying the
waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast of the 48 contiguous States and
Alaska.” 60 Class B is “airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL
surrounding the nation’s busiest airports in terms of [instrument flight rules
(“IFR”)] operations or passenger enplanements,” 61 is specifically tailored to
the area surrounding any particular airport, and requires a pilot obtain
clearance from air traffic control before entering it. 62
Class C airspace extends “from the surface to 4,000 feet above the
airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an
operational control tower, are serviced by a radar approach control, and that
faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/aim_basic_4-03-14.pdf [hereinafter FAA FLIGHT
MANUAL].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at ch. 3-1-1(c). These considerations include “[t]he complexity or density of
aircraft movements, . . . [t]he nature of the operations conducted within the airspace, . . .
[t]he level of safety required, and . . . [t]he national and public interest.” Id.
57. See id. (designating uncontrolled airspace as Class G airspace).
58. Id. at ch. 3-2-1.
59. Id.
60. Id. at ch. 3-2-2(a).
61. Id. at ch. 1-1-3, 3-2-3(a). Instrument flight rules are rules that apply to flights
occurring under instrument meteorological conditions, which are “weather conditions below
the minimums prescribed for flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).” 14. C.F.R. § 170.3.
62. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

12

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

have a certain number of IFR operations or passenger enplanements.” 63
Like Class B airspace, Class C is individually tailored to specific areas near
airports but generally features a “radius core” of five nautical miles that
extends up to four thousand feet above the surface elevation of the airport. 64
Pilots are required to establish two-way communications with air traffic
control prior to entry into Class C airspace, and are subject to speed,
distance, and other requirements while in Class C. 65
Class D consists of airspace extending “from the surface to 2,500 feet
above the airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that
have an operational control tower.” 66 Flight restrictions in this class mirror
that of Class C and pilots are expected to adhere to air traffic control
directives while in this class of airspace. 67 Class E airspace consists of any
other controlled airspace that does not fall in Classes A through D. 68 While
there are no unique requirements applicable to pilots operating in Class E
airspace, they are still expected to abide by FAA regulations governing
communications with air traffic control. 69
2. Uncontrolled Airspace
All airspace not categorized as Class A, B, C, D, or E is regarded as
uncontrolled airspace and designated as Class G airspace. 70 While pilots
flying through uncontrolled airspace are not required to maintain
communication with air traffic control, 71 they must comply with FAA rules
and regulations applicable to uncontrolled airspace. 72 For example, pilots in
uncontrolled airspace must remain “at least 1,000 feet (2,000 feet in
designated mountainous terrain) above the highest obstacle within a
horizontal distance of 4 nautical miles from the course to be flown.” 73
3. Special Use Airspace
FAA regulations define special use airspace as “airspace of defined
dimensions identified by an area on the surface of the earth wherein
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at ch. 3-2-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ch. 3-2-5.
Id.
Id. at ch. 3-2-6(a).
Id.
Id. at ch. 3-3-1.
Id. at ch. 3-3-3.
Id.
Id. at ch. 3-3-3(a).
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activities must be confined because of their nature, or wherein limitations
are imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities,
or both.”
There are several classifications of special use airspace: 74
1) Prohibited Areas: Unauthorized aircraft may not fly through
prohibited areas at any time. 75 Areas designated as prohibited are generally
associated in some way with national security. 76 Examples include the
White House, the National Mall, and Camp David. 77
2) Restricted Areas: Airspace in which flight is not completely
prohibited but is subject to certain restrictions. 78 The nature of restricted
areas is such that outside aircraft may face unique hazards that necessitate
clearance from air traffic control before entering the airspace. 79
3) Warning Areas: Airspace in which hazards may exist but over which
the United States does not have sole jurisdiction. 80 Pilots are merely warned
of potential hazards on flight maps and by air traffic control. 81
4) Military Operation Areas: Airspace reserved for military training and
operations. 82 Pilots must obtain clearance from air traffic control to enter
such airspace during operational times and are otherwise prohibited from
entering. 83
5) Alert Areas: Airspace in which pilots should exert heightened caution
due to increased flight training or other aviation activity. 84 No permission is
generally required to enter such areas but pilots are responsible for adhering
to all normal flight regulations. 85

74. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 14-3 to
14-4 (No. FAA-H-8083-25A, 2008), http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_
manuals/aviation/pilot_handbook/media/FAA-H-8083-25A.pdf
[hereinafter
PILOT’S
HANDBOOK].
75. Id. at 14-3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 14-3 to 14-4.
80. Id. at 14-4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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6) Controlled Firing Areas: Airspace in which ground firing activities
must be suspended when an aircraft is approaching the area. 86 This area is
less of a restriction on pilots in the air than on parties conducting the
exercises on the ground. 87
4. Other Airspace
The “Other Airspace” classification includes all airspace that has not
been categorized as controlled, uncontrolled, or special use. 88 Areas
classified as “Other Airspace” are generally subject to permanent or
temporary flight restrictions 89 for the purpose of protecting military training
routes, existing or imminent hazards, flight operations of disaster relief
aircraft, or the airspace above an incident or event that might attract an
unusually dense gathering of sightseeing aircraft.90
5. FAA Treatment of Tribal Airspace
As noted above, the FAA publishes sectional maps featuring graphical
representations of the various classes and categories of airspace that exist in
particular geographic areas of the United States. 91 Although tribally owned
airports are noted on sectional maps, tribal reservations generally are not 92
and there is no specific class or category of airspace that provides for
specific rules of flight through tribal airspace. Although there are certain
flight rules that apply to airspace over national monuments or other natural
resources that happen to be located on tribal land, 93 FAA regulations do not
currently provide for the treatment of tribal airspace as a distinct
classification in which special flight rules apply. The FAA therefore

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 14-4.
89. Id. at 14-4 to 14-7.
90. Id.
91. Sectional Aeronautical Chart, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/productcatalog/vfrcharts/sectional/ (last modified Sept. 3,
2015).
92. See, e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin., Phoenix Sectional Aeronautical Chart (FAA
Product ID SPHX, 94th ed., eff. Oct. 15, 2015 to Apr. 28, 2016), http://aeronav.faa.gov/
content/aeronav/sectional_files/Phoenix_94.zip (noting the location and elevation of the
Hualapai airport, but not outlining the general boundaries of the reservation).
93. See, e.g., Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of the Grand Canyon National Park,
AZ, 14 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 91 (SFAR No. 50-2, 2014) (establishing flight rules applicable to
overflight of certain areas of the Grand Canyon).
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regulates tribal airspace only incidentally, and to the extent that the airspace
above tribal land falls within regulatory or non-regulatory classifications.
C. The Airspace Rights of Landowners in the United States
Where Congress and the FAA are concerned with the safe and efficient
management of aviation in the nation’s airspace, litigation involving
aviation issues often involves the question of private property rights in
airspace above land and how those rights conflict with—and may be
preempted by—larger public or governmental rights to the use of national
airspace.
Courts at common law considered the property rights of landowners in
airspace to extend from the earth “to the periphery of the universe.” 94 In
1946, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected that doctrine in
United States v. Causby. 95 It concluded that an unlimited private property
right in the airspace above land “has no place in the modern world” and that
“[t]he air is a public highway,” the development of which would be
seriously hampered by recognition of private claims to all airspace above
private land. 96
The Causby court did not foreclose all private airspace rights. It
concluded that “[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the space above
the ground as the [sic] can occupy or use in connection with the land.” 97
Thus, although airspace belongs primarily in the public domain, the Court
held that a taking occurs where flights over private land are “so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land.” 98 Although the Supreme Court further affirmed the
principle that travel in navigable airspace is a public right in cases like
Griggs v. Allegheny County 99 and Aaron v. United States, 100 the law of
private ownership of airspace above land has not changed much since
Causby.
94. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 261.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id. at 266.
99. 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (holding that county governments are not immune from the
Causby air easement taking standard and explaining that the government should take into
account the necessity of providing for a safe approach area when acquiring public property
near an airport).
100. 311 F.2d 798 (1963) (holding that a taking occurs where air traffic is consistently
below 500 feet and that the public has a right to unimpeded travel in the airspace above that
height).
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It is now well-settled that landowners have no claim to airspace beyond
that which is necessary to achieve a productive purpose on the land itself. 101
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered the question of whether
this principle applies to the airspace above tribal land, at least one federal
circuit has attempted to address the issue of whether tribal ownership of
land has any bearing on a legal analysis of property rights in airspace.
In Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 102 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard
an appeal involving an Indian tribe that sued the owner of a private airport.
The airport was situated at the boundary line between the airport owner’s
land and tribal land, and featured two runways, which extended to the
Tribe’s boundary line. 103 Consequently, the majority of aircraft landing and
departing at the airport flew within the Tribe’s airspace at heights as low as
150 feet from the ground. 104
In assessing whether the Tribe was harmed by these incursions, the Court
adopted the theory of aerial trespass described in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 105 Under this theory, flight into the airspace of a private landowner
is considered trespass only if two conditions are met: (1) the plane “enters
into the immediate reaches of the airspace next to the land,” and (2) it
“interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his land.” 106
The Court concluded the appellant Indian Tribe had neither shown nor
even argued that there was substantial interference with actual use of the
land. 107 Further, the Court was unwilling to presume nominal damages for
aerial trespass, holding instead the Tribe had the burden of alleging and
proving actual damages. 108 The lowered commercial value of the tribal land
adjoining the airport runway was instead considered to be “speculative” and
a “mere possibility.” 109
While Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith is notable for its application of the tort
of trespass to private airspace, it is worth emphasizing that the Court did not
consider whether the sovereign status of the Tribe rendered the action

101. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
102. Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974).
103. Id. at 1044.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1045.
106. Id. at 1045 n.3.
107. Id. at 1045. The Appellant contended that the constant low-altitude air traffic in the
Tribe’s airspace rendered the tribal land below unmarketable for commercial development.
Id. at 1044.
108. Id. at 1045.
109. Id. at 1046.
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something more than a simple private trespass action. 110 The Sandia court
also failed to address the Tribe’s claim that the commercial value of the
land was significantly reduced due to the extremely low flight paths. 111
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to analyze the tribal
airspace issue through the lens of federal Indian law, it failed to do so.
D. State Regulation of State Airspace
The federal government’s declaration of supremacy over the regulation
of U.S. airspace was intended to prevent inconsistent state regulations from
creating an unsafe air travel environment throughout the country. 112 While
federal regulation of United States airspace remains supreme, state and
local governments possess a limited ability to enact aviation regulations that
do not conflict with federal aviation laws. This raises the question of
whether Indian tribes are entitled to, at the very least, a similarly limited
regulatory power over aviation activities.
In Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that federal preemption of airspace regulation does not prevent a
city from prohibiting seaplanes from landing or operating on a city lake. 113
In doing so, the court distinguished federal preemption of regulation of
navigable airspace, from the limited right of state and local governments to
regulate surface areas used for takeoff and landing of aircraft. 114 Thus,
common law draws a clear distinction between regulation of aviation
activities in airspace and regulation of aviation-related activities on the
ground, which are not exclusively controlled by the federal government.
State and local governments ultimately may not regulate any portion of
aviation law that is already exclusively occupied by the federal
government. 115
While the federal government maintains supremacy in regulating the use
and classification of navigable airspace, state and local governments do
have some ability to regulate certain uses of local airspace. In Center for
Bio-Ethical Reform v. City of Honolulu, the U.S. District Court of Hawaii
110. It is unclear whether the Tribe ever raised this argument at trial. While failure to do
so would have precluded them from raising the argument on appeal even if they wanted to,
there are no indications in the appellate court’s opinion that the tribe made the arguments at
trial, or attempted to on appeal.
111. Pueblo of Sandia, 497 F.2d at 1046.
112. BANNER, supra note 43, at 161.
113. 76 F.3d 778, 790 (6th Cir. 1996).
114. Id. at 783.
115. Id. at 789.
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held a city ordinance banning aerial advertising was not preempted by a
federal scheme of issuing waivers for planes to tow advertising banners in
the sky. 116 The court drew a distinction between the federal rules, which
regulated the flow of air traffic, and the city ordinance, which was enacted
to prevent congestion of airspace by airplane advertisements. 117
On balance, federal courts have largely limited state and local regulation
of aviation to those laws that do not significantly interfere with the federal
government’s ability to regulate the use of navigable airspace. 118 It remains
an open question whether federal courts would acknowledge that tribal
governments possess at least the same regulatory power over aviation
activities that state and local governments possess. However, several Indian
tribes have not allowed this uncertainty to keep them from pursuing their
own efforts to regulate the use of tribal airspace.
E. Tribal Regulation of Tribal Airspace
Tribes such as the Hualapai 119 and Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 120
whose reservations contain natural landscapes that serve as popular tourist
destinations, are increasingly aware of the threat unimpeded air traffic can
pose to the safety and well-being of those living on the reservations. 121
Helicopter, small airplane, and glider air tours are not uncommon in such

116. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (D. Haw. 2004).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal.
1970) (holding that a city ordinance which sought to prevent the takeoff of aircraft during
certain hours was preempted by federal law), aff’d, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972), aff’d, 411
U.S. 624 (1973); United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Ohio 1978)
(holding that federal aviation law preempted a city ordinance which would have required
aircraft to make a specific turn after takeoff to control noise over a residential area), aff’d,
621 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1980).
119. See, e.g., ABOUT HUALAPAI, supra note 6 (“An outdoorsman’s paradise, the
[Hualapai] reservation is rich in hunting, fishing, and river rafting opportunities. The tribe
sells guided big-game hunting permits for desert bighorn sheep, trophy elk, antelope, and
mountain lion.”).
120. See, e.g., Cherokee Attractions, CHEROKEE NORTH CAROLINA (2014),
http://visitcherokeenc.com/attractions-in-cherokee-nc/ (describing the range of outdoor
attractions offered to tourists on the tribal lands of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians).
121. See IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ 88 (2000) (“Military overflight has become such a
reservation commonplace that some tribes have considered the possibility of restricting their
air space.”).
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areas, 122 and tribes are increasingly justified in asserting their right to
control the use of tribal airspace for recreational or commercial purposes. 123
The Hualapai Tribe, for example, owns and operates two airports on its
lands: the private-use Hualapai Airport, and the public-use Grand Canyon
West Airport. 124 The Grand Canyon West Airport is essential to the
Hualapai tourism industry, as it is the primary hub for the Hualapaiauthorized air tours that provide tourists with birds-eye views of the
western rim of the Grand Canyon, which is located within the Hualapai
reservation and owned by the Tribe. 125 Though wholly owned by the Tribe,
the airports are subject to FAA regulation and are required to operate in
accordance with federal guidelines. 126 The Hualapai’s successful
management of its airports and its proactive efforts to maintain a safe flying
environment are convincing evidence that modern Indian tribes are fully
capable of embracing modern aviation standards and responsibly managing
the use of tribal airspace.
While the federal government has not yet acknowledged that Indian
tribes possess sovereign authority in tribal airspace, several tribes have
asserted such a right in their respective constitutions and tribal codes. The
Constitution of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, for example, declares
sovereign jurisdiction over “all waters and air space within the Indian
Country . . . over which the Citizen Potawatomi Nation has authority.” 127
Several other tribes have included similar language in their constitutions, 128
122. See IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ 88 (2000).
123. See Victoria L. Gerberich, An Evaluation of Sustainable American Indian Tourism,
in INDIGENOUS TOURISM : THE COMMODIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CULTURE 77 (Chris
Ryan & Michelle Aicken eds., 2005) (“With the increased adoption of tourism on
reservations and the increased interest in visiting reservations, there is a need to ensure that
policies are in place that will mitigate the negative impacts that tourism development could
have on reservations.”).
124. See Airport Master Records & Reports: Grand Canyon West Airport, AIRPORT IQ
5010, http://www.gcr1.com/5010web/airport.cfm?Site=1G4&AptSecNum=0 (last modified
Aug. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Grand Canyon West Airport]; Airport Master Records &
Reports: Hualapai Airport, AIRPORT IQ 5010, http://www.gcr1.com/5010web/airport.cfm?
Site=3AZ5&AptSecNum=0 (last modified Aug. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Hualapai Airport].
125. See Hualapai Tourism – Information, HUALAPAI TRIBE (2010), http://www.hualapai
tourism.com/questions.php#3 (“Originally, there was just a small dirt air strip, now there is
an airport that accommodates nearly 30 tour companies with a 5,000-foot paved runway and
10 helipads.”).
126. Hualapai Airport, supra note 124; Grand Canyon West Airport, supra note 124.
127. CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1.
128. See COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE CONST. art. I, § 1 (“The jurisdiction of the Coquille
Indian Tribe shall extend, to the fullest extent possible . . . over all lands, waters, property,
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while others have passed civil ordinances acknowledging sovereignty in
airspace and implementing airspace management plans. 129
Such assertions of sovereignty in tribal laws are evidence that tribes
increasingly recognize the importance of asserting regulatory authority in
airspace. Nevertheless, such assertions may not be enough on their own to
counter various federal doctrines that opponents of tribal sovereignty in
airspace may raise in arguing that Indian tribes do not possess inherent
authority to regulate tribal airspace.
III. A Review of Tribal Sovereignty Under Federal Law
The question of whether Indian tribes possess inherent authority to
regulate tribal airspace is informed by three key areas of federal Indian law:
(1) the sovereign status of tribal governments, (2) the scope of tribal
property rights under federal law, and (3) the extent of a tribe’s criminal
and civil jurisdiction in over members and non-members in Indian
Country. 130
A. Tribal Sovereignty
1. The Marshall Trilogy
A persistent misconception among the American public is that Indian
tribes possess full sovereign rights and exist as completely foreign
governments within the borders of the United States. 131 Although many
airspace, minerals and other natural resources . . . owned by the Tribe or held in trust by the
United States for the Tribe.”); see also SNOQUALMIE INDIAN TRIBE CONST. art. I, § 4(a) (“The
jurisdiction and governmental power of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe extends to all persons,
property, lands, both running waters, and . . . airspace”); see also WHITE EARTH NATION
CONST. ch. 1 (establishing jurisdiction over “airspace . . . located within the boundaries of
the White Earth Reservation”).
129. See, e.g., E. BAND CHEROKEE NATION CODE § 113A-22 (2010) (declaring sovereign
control over tribal airspace); Air Tour Management Plan, E. BAND CHEROKEE NATION CODE
§ 113A-26 (2010) (tasking the tribe’s Tribal Business Committee with “ensuring the safe
and efficient use of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Nation's airspace and [protecting] the
public health and welfare from aircraft noise and pollution”); NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 16,
§ 2203(C) (2009) (describing tribal lands as including airspace); SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE
tit. 5.4, § 4.0 (2009) (describing tribal lands as including “all . . . airspace within the exterior
boundaries of the Snoqualmie Indian Reservations”).
130. “Indian Country” is used here according to its statutory definition, which
encompasses Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments. See
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
131. This most frequently manifests itself through the mistaken belief that Indians in the
United States are not required to pay any external taxes, and that tribes are free to ignore
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persuasively argue that the framers of the Constitution viewed Indian
nations as wholly separate from the federal system, 132 over time the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause as
granting Congress a plenary power over Indian nations. 133 The doctrine of
plenary power has since been used to justify extensive federal control over
Indian tribes and Indian people. 134 The turning point in the legal
federal laws without consequence. See Jodi Rave, Native Americans & Taxes, POYNTER
(Mar. 7, 2005, 11:44 AM), http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/newsgathering-storytelling/
diversity-at-work/34182/native-americans-taxes/ (describing and attacking the common
misconception that Indians in the United States do not pay taxes).
132. There are only three references to Indian nations in the United States Constitution.
The primary focus of Supreme Court analysis has been the text of the Indian Commerce
Clause, which states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with . . .
the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court has interpreted this language,
which many would read to imply a grant of power to Congress to regulate commercial
relations between the United States and Indian tribes, as conferring a plenary power to
Congress over Indian tribes generally. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565
(1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”). Many scholars
argue that the federal plenary power is an unconstitutional fiction and that the federal
government has no such control over Indian tribes. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The
Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007)
(arguing that the Founders intended that the Indian Commerce Clause would grant only a
limited scope of federal power over trade with Indian tribes, and that Indians living within
the boundaries of states were to be subject to state, not federal, police power). However,
some scholars have come to a different conclusion. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002) (arguing that the
U.S. Constitution provides no basis for the Supreme Court’s doctrine of federal plenary
power over Indian tribes). The other two references to Indians both deal with the
apportionment of representatives and taxes, and mention them only to specify that the census
taken to determine such apportionment “exclud[es] Indians not taxed.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
133. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (holding that although the
Commerce Clause does not explicitly grant Congress plenary power over Indians, that power
can be inferred from the manner in which tribes are mentioned and that “[t]he power of the
general government over [Indians] . . . is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell”); see also Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553 (holding that
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs grants it the right to unilaterally abrogate
treaties with Indian tribes).
134. Discussion of the constitutionality of the plenary power doctrine in the federal
courts in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been limited. While federal courts now
assume that Congress has plenary power over tribes, many Indian law scholars, practitioners,
and tribal courts are not so convinced. See generally CLINTON, supra note 132 (arguing that
the plenary power doctrine is unconstitutional).
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relationship between tribes and the United States has its roots in a series of
foundational Supreme Court cases known as the Marshall Trilogy. 135
The Marshall Trilogy cases establish that Indian tribes are not domestic
states or foreign nations under federal law, 136 but “domestic dependent
nations” 137 which possess a fundamental right of occupancy to aboriginal or
reserved tribal lands. 138 This right of occupancy, known as aboriginal title,
can only be relinquished with the consent of the federal government. 139 The
Marshall Trilogy further established that state laws are generally
inapplicable against Indian tribes unless specifically authorized by
Congress. 140 While tribes retain some inherent sovereign powers, the Court
has held many rights otherwise available to independent sovereign nations
are incompatible with the domestic dependent nation status of Indian
tribes. 141
2. Tribal Self Governance
The degradation of tribal sovereignty to fit into the judicially-created
category of “domestic dependent nations” has not completely foreclosed all
tribal sovereign powers. Over time, courts and Congress have consistently
recognized the right of Indian tribes “to make their own laws and be ruled
by them.” 142 Further, while Supreme Court opinions have narrowly
construed the nature of tribal self-governance (especially where tribes
attempt to assert civil or criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians), 143 it has
also fundamentally affirmed the right of tribes to “punish tribal
offenders, . . . determine tribal membership, [] regulate domestic relations
among members, and [] prescribe rules of inheritance for members.” 144

135. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 (5 Pet.) U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
136. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
137. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 583.
138. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588, 603.
139. Id. at 588.
140. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 593-94. For an example of the congressional
application of state law in Indian Country, see Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 280-505, 67
Stat. 588, 588-90 (1953) (applying general state criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country
within seven states).
141. See e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (describing the
doctrine of implicit divestiture).
142. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
143. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding
that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
144. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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The Court has also recognized the right of tribes to regulate economic
activity occurring within tribal borders 145 and the jurisdiction of tribal
courts over civil disputes between tribal members on tribal land. 146
Essentially, Indian tribes have a recognized sovereign right to “protect
tribal self-government [and] control internal relations” as long as such
rights are deemed consistent with tribes’ domestic dependent status.147
3. Reserved Rights and Implicit Divestiture
Treaties between the United States and Indian tribes frequently served to
define a range of basic rights that tribes wished to preserve, but also
sometimes contained limitations on those rights or abrogated them
altogether. 148 Known as the doctrine of reserved rights, this doctrine thus
preserves any sovereign aboriginal rights that have not been expressly
extinguished by treaty. 149
While the doctrine of reserved rights can serve to protect tribal interests,
it can also be defeated by a showing that the right asserted by the tribe is
inconsistent with the tribe’s status as a domestic dependent nation. 150 This
doctrine, known as implicit divestiture, has most frequently been used
where tribes have attempted to assert some measure of authority over nonIndians. 151 Thus, one major objection to tribal sovereignty in airspace may
145. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (holding that tribes
have the inherent sovereign power to impose taxes on non-Indians doing business with a
tribe on a reservation).
146. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63-64 (1978) (affirming the right
of tribes to determine tribal membership guidelines free of intervention by outside
governments); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (affirming the inherent
sovereign right of tribes to punish Indians who violate tribal law within tribal territory).
147. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
148. See, e.g., Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.-Delaware Nation, art. 6, Sept. 17, 1778, 7
Stat. 13 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort Pitt] (guaranteeing the Delaware Nation “all their
territorial rights in the fullest and most ample manner”).
149. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding that the tribal rights
described in a treaty between the Yakima Nation and the United States “was not a grant of
rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them[:] a reservation of those not granted”);
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE : INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 67 (2009) (“In the reserved rights approach . . . the treaty reflects what a tribe
has given up, with everything else not so surrendered as reserved.”).
150. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
151. See id.
[T]he sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses
clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly
lost by virtue of their dependent status. The areas in which such implicit
divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving
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be that tribes have been implicitly divested of the ability to control entry
into tribal airspace because such power is inconsistent with the character of
a domestic dependent nation. 152
4. Tribal Power to Exclude Non-Members
The Supreme Court has concluded that “a hallmark of Indian sovereignty
is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands.” 153 In Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Court acknowledged the inherent sovereign
authority of tribes to completely exclude or condition the presence of nonmembers from tribal lands. 154 The majority noted that “[w]hen a tribe grants
a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to exercise
its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as [they comply] with the
initial conditions of entry.” 155 It further clarified a tribe does not completely
give up its sovereign right to exclude when it grants entry to a non-member,
but can exclude a person even after granting them permission to enter tribal
land. 156
The Court later clarified the tribal power to exclude from tribal
boundaries reaches not only non-Indians, but non-member Indians as
well. 157 As discussed in Part IV infra, the tribal power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation may serve as an important legal basis for the
assertion of tribal jurisdiction in airspace.
B. Tribal Property Rights
Given that tribal airspace exists in the space above tribal land, it is
natural to ask what claims, if any, tribes may have to tribal airspace as
sovereign owners of that property. This inquiry is complicated by doctrines
of federal Indian law that regard Indian nations and their citizens as mere
occupants of land held in trust by the United States government.
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.
Id. at 326.
152. See supra Part I.D (discussing this particular objection).
153. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
154. Id. at 144 (“Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the
tribe's power to exclude them. This power necessarily includes the lesser power to place
conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct . . . .”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 145 (“A nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to
the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign power.”).
157. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) (“A tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is
equally well established.”).
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Historically, the property rights of Indian tribes were defined internally,
through tribal law and custom, and through the use of treaties with other
nations. 158 The United States ratified its first treaty with an Indian tribe
during the Revolutionary War 159 and entered into more than four hundred
treaties with Indian nations before ending the practice of treating with tribes
in 1871. 160 Such treaties typically included a provision defining the
boundaries of tribal territory along with a statement that the non-tribal
sovereign would respect those boundaries. 161 Further, while many U.S.
treaties specifically recognized a tribe’s right to exclude non-members from
their lands, they also frequently contained exceptions for the safe passage of
United States citizens and officials. 162
The doctrine of discovery and the restrictions on alienation it placed on
Indian land represented a major change in the federal posture toward Indian
land rights. 163 In the decade following Johnson v. M’Intosh, the federal
government began removing Indian tribes westward in an effort to free up
valuable land for American settlement. 164 It accomplished this largely
through forced removal of tribes with the passage of the Removal Act of
1830. 165

158. See, e.g., Treaty of Fort Pitt, supra note 148.
159. Id.
160. Indian Affairs FAQs, U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/
(last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (“Congress ended treaty-making with Indian tribes in 1871.
Since then, relations with Indian groups have been formalized and/or codified by
Congressional acts, Executive Orders, and Executive Agreements.”).
161. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.-Creek Nation, art. 4, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35
(describing the boundaries of the Creek Nation).
162. See, e.g., Treaty with the Apaches, U.S.-Apache Tribe, art. 7, July 1, 1852, 10 Stat.
979 (“The people of the United States of America shall have free and safe passage through
the territory of the aforesaid Indians, under such rules and regulations as may be adopted by
authority of the said States.”).
163. The Nonintercourse Act of 1790 states that “[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.” Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. 137,
138 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)). The Court in Johnson v. M’Intosh
went a step further by explicitly granting the United States ultimate fee simple title to Indian
lands and the concurrent right to unilaterally extinguish Indian tribes’ aboriginal occupancy
rights, by treaty or otherwise. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-88, 595-97, 603-05 (1823).
164. See CAROLE GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 20-22 (6th ed. 2010).
165. Id.
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In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (“Allotment
Act”). 166 The Allotment Act effectively destroyed many reservations by
allotting parcels of land formerly owned by a tribe to individual Indians and
making those allottees subject to the general laws of the state in which the
land was located. 167
Scholars have noted the Allotment Act “all but ended the collective
nature of tribal land tenure on affected reservations and . . . [f]or the first
time, [permitted] non-Indians [] to live in Indian country in large numbers
without being federally licensed traders.” 168 Patterns of problematic
“checkerboard jurisdiction” were created as the presence of non-Indians
increased within and around the reservations and Indian communities
affected by allotment, especially those communities that maintained
reservation status but also had several non-Indian owned parcels located
within their boundaries. 169
The Allotment Act represents a period in American history now at odds
with modern congressional policy. Beginning with the Indian
Reorganization Act (“IRA”) in 1934, 170 Congress began to reverse its
policy of breaking up collective tribal land holdings and embraced a policy
of encouraging Indian self-determination. 171 Consequently, this recognition
of collective tribal land boundaries represented a renewal of Congress’s
acknowledgment of collective tribal land rights and evinced an
understanding of the difference between individual property ownership and
tribal ownership.

166. See id. at 25.
167. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
331) (repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991
(2000)); Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native
American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609, 613-18 (2011) (describing
the effect of allotment on Indian tribes).
168. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 164, at 25.
169. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 41421, 457-59 (1989) (describing jurisdictional problems arising from checkerboard jurisdiction
created by allotment of tribal land).
170. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012)).
171. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (“On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian reservation,
created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive
order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.”).
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C. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
Tribal regulation of airspace is primarily a jurisdictional issue. In
imposing and enforcing rules governing the use of tribal airspace, the
question necessarily arises as to whether the tribe has jurisdiction over the
pilots in command of the aircraft that travel through tribal airspace.
Although no court has addressed this question, established doctrines of
tribal civil jurisdiction in federal Indian law provide a starting point for this
inquiry.
The Supreme Court established limits on tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-members in Montana v. United States in 1981 and Strate v. A-1
Contractors in 1997. 172 Under the doctrine espoused in these cases, there is
a presumptive prohibition against Indian tribes exerting civil authority over
non-Indians unless one or more exceptions are met.
Under Montana and Strate, tribes may have civil jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and non-Indians where (1) there is a consensual
relationship between the non-member/non-Indian and the tribe/tribal
member, and the incident in question arose out of that relationship, 173 or (2)
the activity of the non-member Indian or non-Indian on fee or tribal land
within the reservation “threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 174
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have construed the term
“consensual relationship” narrowly, and given the political integrity,
economic security, and health or welfare exception a similar treatment. 175
Thus, a tribe cannot simply claim civil jurisdiction by asserting that the
activity of a non-member Indian or non-Indian somehow affects the welfare
of the tribe—it must show interference with a core element of tribal
governance in the absence of an incident arising out of a narrow and welldefined consensual relationship. 176
Federal doctrines of tribal jurisdiction raise questions as to whether tribes
possess the requisite jurisdiction over non-Indian or non-member Indian
pilots who fly aircraft through tribal airspace. A federal court is unlikely to
conclude that pilots whose flights originate and end outside of tribal

172. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
173. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-57; Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
174. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
175. See id.
176. Id.
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airspace have established the kind of consensual relationship required by
the Montana and Strate cases.
Tribes might be more successful in claiming low-altitude overflights
through tribal airspace directly and negatively affect the health, welfare, or
economic security of the tribe, in accordance with the second exception to
the general rule. As Part VI argues, however, these jurisdictional questions
could be rendered moot by congressional affirmation of tribal sovereignty
in airspace and a cooperative partnership between Indian tribes and the
FAA in the enforcement of tribal sovereignty in airspace.
IV. Arguments for the Assertion of Jurisdiction in Airspace by Indian Tribes
The Hualapai Tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction in its airspace did not
culminate in federal litigation. 177 Mr. de Antoni pled guilty to the trespass,
paid a fine, and the Tribe returned his personal property. 178 Thus, the Tribe
successfully asserted its sovereign authority to regulate the use of its
airspace by non-members. Mr. de Antoni’s guilty plea and payment of the
fine also foreclosed the possibility that a tribal or federal court would be
forced to address the questions that would be raised about the Tribe’s
ability to assert authority in airspace.
The legal arguments in such a proceeding would likely have involved all
of the legal doctrines discussed in Parts II and III of this article. In
determining the reach of the Tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction, for example, a
court would have considered whether federal aviation laws and regulations
preempt tribal jurisdiction. It also would have critically examined any
purported legal sources of authority for the tribal power to regulate
airspace. In the author’s view, the proposition that Indian tribes can regulate
tribal airspace is most strongly supported by (1) inherent tribal sovereignty
and (2) the tribal power to exclude non-members from tribal territory. This
Part provides a broad outline of those justifications, while Part V examines
the likely counterarguments that would be raised in response.
A. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
As sovereign entities, tribal governments are endowed with the inherent
authority to pass and enforce laws to protect the general welfare, health, and
safety of their citizenry. 179 This right is recognized by Congress and the
177. Wood, supra note 19.
178. Id.
179. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (recognizing the right of Indian
tribes to “make their own laws and be ruled by them”).
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federal courts, and is the basis for a wide range of laws passed by Indian
tribes for the benefit of their members. 180 As part of this inherent sovereign
authority, tribes are necessarily endowed with a general police power which
justifies the enforcement of tribal law as a means of protecting tribal
citizens. 181 This tribal police power is part of the sovereign arsenal through
which Indian tribes may maintain law and order within their respective
territories.
The inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to enact laws designed
to protect the general welfare, health, and security of tribal citizens is
arguably the primary source of a tribe’s power to regulate airspace. As the
source of a tribe’s legal authority, it allows a tribal governing body to enact
tribal laws to address activities on a reservation that may pose a threat to
safety if left unregulated. For example, in enacting ordinances that address
automobile traffic, the governing body of a tribe may have concluded that
such laws are necessary to ensure that tribal citizens and visitors to tribal
territory are adequately protected against dangers arising from the use of
automobiles. Some of those dangers could be unique to the geographic
qualities of the reservation and, in the tribe’s view, it is therefore necessary
for tribal law to supplement or replace traffic laws that may govern the use
of automobiles in surrounding non-Indian areas.
In the same way, a tribe could conclude that existing FAA regulations do
not go far enough in protecting tribal interests on tribal land. Although the
FAA is required to “[c]onsult with American Indian and Alaska Native
Tribes before taking any actions that may significantly or uniquely affect
them[,]” 182 it is not clear that such consultations have resulted in any
significant federal protections in airspace for tribal interests. A tribe may
conclude that it would prefer that noise from overflights of commercial or
general aviation aircraft originating from non-Indian areas nearby be
reduced much more than provided for by FAA regulations, or eliminated
altogether by restricting flights over certain reservation areas. Although as a
practical matter a tribe could attempt to petition the FAA for more
restrictive rules, ultimately the question of whether or not tribal interests are
served or harmed by aviation activities in tribal airspace should be left to
tribal governments to determine, not the FAA.
180. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
181. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
182. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation
Policy and Procedures, Order No. 1210.20 (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www.faa.gov/document
Library/media/1210.pdf.
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Opponents of tribal authority in airspace might argue the tribal police
power is in reality not an inherent sovereign power at all, but rather a
delegated federal authority. If a power is delegated by the federal
government, the source of that power is the sovereignty of the United
States, not Indian tribes. This argument fails however, because the Supreme
Court has recognized that such inherent sovereign powers are not
delegations of federal power but rather preexisting tribal powers that have
not been abrogated by the federal government. 183 Tribes are thus
theoretically endowed with the ability to regulate tribal airspace to protect
the general welfare, safety, and security of its members. However, it may be
that this justification applies only where a tribe exerts its jurisdiction to
regulate the behavior of tribal members. If a tribe’s inherent authority to
regulate activity on a reservation is primarily limited to members, its ability
to regulate the behavior of non-member and non-Indian pilots must arise
from another legal authority.
B. Tribal Power to Exclude Non-Members
While the authority to physically exclude non-members from tribal
territory arises out of a tribe’s general police power, 184 it is regarded by
federal courts as a fundamental sovereign right. 185 Further, it is not simply a
right to make someone leave—it is a right to impose conditions of entry. 186
A fundamental premise of tribal authority in airspace must be that a tribe
has the ability to regulate pilots flying aircraft through tribal airspace,
whether they are tribal members or not. Although a tribe might more
readily regulate the behavior of tribal members operating aircraft in tribal
airspace, it must also be able to extend its regulatory reach to non-member
pilots who pass through the tribe’s airspace. The power to exclude could
serve as the legal basis for that authority. A tribe could theoretically use the
power to completely exclude non-members from certain altitudes of
airspace over the reservation. Additionally, the tribe could impose certain
183. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that the power to
punish a tribal offender for an assault on a federal officer which occurred on tribal land is an
inherent sovereign right and not a delegation of federal authority).
184. See Jerry Gardner, Tribal Efforts to Address Problems Presented by the Lack of
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians, in INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES
162 (Justin B. Richland & Sarah Deer eds., 2d ed. 2010) (“Indian Nations have inherent
sovereign authority to exclude (or banish) persons (including non-Indians)”).
185. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) (“A tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is
equally well established.”)
186. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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conditions on the use of its airspace given that the power to exclude nonmembers includes the power to require non-members to adhere to certain
rules if they desire to remain in tribal territory. For example, a tribe might
decide to restrict certain areas of tribal airspace completely while allowing
for limited overflight around other areas at designated altitudes.
No federal court has addressed the issue of whether the right to exclude
non-members extends to tribal airspace. Therefore, opponents of the idea
may argue that tribes should not attempt to exert that kind of authority in
airspace absent official federal acknowledgment of that right. A tribe might
respond that the right to exclude non-members from tribal lands should
extend to airspace because the fundamental principles are the same—
conditioning the entry and presence of a non-member to protect the tribe, its
citizens, and its resources. Further, a tribe might argue that the right to
exclude in airspace has not been abrogated by federal action and is
therefore a reserved right. It might also point to the necessity of protecting
tribal citizens from aircraft noise, air pollution, aircraft accidents, and other
effects of aviation in tribal airspace.
While established principles of federal Indian law may support the tribal
right to claim sovereignty in tribal airspace, some may ask whether tribes
are realistically justified in asserting such a right. After all, the federal
aviation system in the United States is regarded as the safest and most
efficient in the world, and global air travel is the safest it has been in
years. 187 The standards enforced by that system are responsible for the safe
commercial and recreational air travel in United States airspace.
The Hualapai incident involving Mr. de Antoni’s unauthorized flight
through the tribe’s airspace is illustrative of the very real problems that
modern Indian tribes face today. In that case, the Hualapai Tribe purported
to exercise its sovereignty in tribal airspace for two reasons: (1) to protect
the air traffic at its on-reservation airports from unauthorized incursion, 188
187. See Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Airline Industry at Its Safest Since the Dawn
of the Jet Age, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/business/
2012-was-the-safest-year-for-airlines-globally-since-1945.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(describing an increase in safety in domestic and international aviation due to heightened
federal guidelines and the FAA's adoption of a more proactive approach to ensuring aviation
safety); see also Memorandum, Subcommittee Hearing on “Review of FAA’s Progress in
Implementing the FAA Modernization and Reform Act” (May 10, 2013), http://
transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/documents/2013-05-16-aviation_ssm.pdf (describing
the United States aviation system as “the safest in the world” due to the combined efforts of
legislative, administrative, and corporate partnerships).
188. Cole, Stalemate, supra note 9 (“The [Hualapai] tribe accuses the pilot of entering
tribal land without permission to take photographs, and of causing potentially unsafe
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and (2) to control the exploitation of its resources from unauthorized
commercial gain. 189 Many Indian tribes today are similarly sufficiently
modernized to be concerned with the effects that even federally regulated
low-level air traffic can cause within a reservation. 190 This is especially true
of tribes that own and operate airports within their reservations, and those
whose location might attract excessive aviation activities such as airplane
and helicopter tours. 191
Even those tribes that do not operate private or public airports on
reservation land may have genuine concerns about the threat unimpeded air
traffic at low altitudes may pose to the safety and welfare of tribal
residents. 192 The risks come not just from the direct effects of the airplanes
to people on the ground, but from the accidents that can occur due to certain
obstacles that exist in low-altitude airspace, for example, power lines,
electrical and cell phone towers, trees, and other high-reaching
impediments. 193 It is therefore vital tribes have the ability to determine who
may or may not enter those classes of airspace in which errant, nonpermitted flights might interfere with the health, safety, and general welfare
of tribal citizens.

conditions in an area where about 11,500 flights occurred from September through
December.”).
189. See id. By regulating which air tour companies may operate in Hualapai airspace,
the tribe maintains a degree of control over who may use its resources for commercial gain.
190. The Seminole Tribe of Florida, for example, owns and operates a private airport
within its Big Cypress reservation. See Big Cypress Airfield Airport (59FD) in Immokalee,
Florida, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/airports/Big-Cypress-Airfield-AirportImmokalee-Florida.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (describing the Seminole Tribe of
Florida's ownership of Big Cypress Airfield Airport in Immokalee, Florida).
191. While not all tribal reservations are situated in the midst of land that lends itself to
outdoor tourism, even those tribes which are situated near airports, such as the Pueblo of
Sandia may have to deal with low-flying aircraft on a regular basis. See supra Part II.C. The
existence of tribal sovereignty in airspace should thus grants tribes, at the very least, an
authoritative voice in the FAA’s process of dealing with such disturbances.
192. See Bruce Landsberg, Most Dangerous Game, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N
(Nov. 1, 1996), http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/sp9611.html (stating that aviation
accidents occurring as a result of low-altitude flights have been “repeated enough times in
real-life general aviation that the AOPA Air Safety Foundation decided to look more closely
at maneuvering flight mishaps”).
193. See H. Dean Chamberlain, The Hazards of Low Altitude and Off-Airport Flight
Operations, AVSTOP.COM, http://avstop.com/stories/low.html (last visited May 13, 2013)
(describing the safety risks pilots flying in low-altitude airspace may encounter).
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V. Objections to Tribal Sovereignty in Airspace
Although the prior section describes a legal basis for the assertion of
tribal authority in airspace, opponents of the idea may raise several credible
objections that tribes will likely be required to address should the issue ever
reach a federal court.
A. Objection 1: Tribal Sovereignty in Airspace Is Preempted by Federal
Law
Opponents of tribal authority in airspace may argue the United States’
declared sovereign supremacy over all airspace within the country’s
borders 194 and the federal government’s exclusive occupation aviation
regulation preempts Indian tribes from exercising any regulatory control in
tribal airspace. Although the Supreme Court has historically interpreted
statutes that explicitly concern Indians in a way that favors tribal
interests, 195 federal statutes of general applicability that do not expressly
mention Indian tribes may not be interpreted so favorably. 196 Thus,
opponents may argue that the Air Commerce Act of 1926—which does not
mention Indians, Indian tribes, or tribal airspace—is a statute of general
applicability that preempts tribal authority to regulate tribal airspace, which
technically falls within the national airspace. Opponents might also argue
the extensive federal aviation regulatory system forecloses tribal regulation
in this area because it is evidence of congressional intent to exclusively
occupy the field of aviation in the United States.
While these arguments are formidable, it is by no means certain that they
cannot be successfully challenged by a tribe. Just as federal aviation law
does not completely preempt state governments from exerting some
measure of sovereign regulatory control over aviation activities in state
airspace, 197 tribes could argue that, at the very least, they possess the same
power to regulate some aspects of aviation activity. Tribes might also assert
that, under existing principles of federal Indian law, Congress must
explicitly state it intends to override the sovereignty of Indian tribes in
194. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)).
195. This approach, known as the Indian Canons of Construction, seems to be falling out
of favor with the modern Supreme Court but has been used in many key Indian law cases in
the past. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 164, at 218-22 (discussing the Indian Canons of
Construction).
196. See id. at 222-24 (discussing the inapplicability of the Indian Canons of
Construction to general federal statutes).
197. See supra Part II.D.
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tribal airspace. 198 While a federal court may be hostile to these responses, it
is important that tribes prepare to directly address preemption arguments.
B. Objection 2: Tribes Have Been Implicitly Divested of Sovereignty in
Airspace
Opponents of tribal authority in airspace may also argue Indian tribes
have been divested of sovereignty in airspace and assertion of tribal
jurisdiction in airspace—particularly over non-members—is inconsistent
with the domestic dependent status of Indian tribes under federal law.
Tribes may respond that the shift in federal policy toward the
encouragement and affirmation of tribal self-governance is evidence that
tribes are no longer dependent upon the federal government to the extent
that they may have been in the past. 199 Thus, traditional implicit divestiture
analysis is increasingly becoming an anachronism as Indian tribes begin to
outgrow antiquated federal perceptions about the ability of tribal
governments to operate in a self-sustaining manner.
Another important component of the implicit divestiture inquiry is
whether tribes have historically conceded such rights by treaty or other
arrangement with the United States. As all treaties between tribes and the
United States were negotiated and ratified prior to 1871, 200 the parties
during that period had no way of knowing that aviation would later become
a central form of travel. Thus, there were no standard treaty provisions that
expressly guaranteed tribal sovereignty over the navigable airspace above
tribal lands.
C. Objection 3: Tribes Do Not Have Regulatory Jurisdiction Over NonMember Pilots
Opponents may finally argue that Indian tribes do not possess regulatory
jurisdiction over non-member pilots and therefore cannot enforce tribal
regulations in airspace. This is likely to be another significant legal hurdle
should the issue ever be litigated in federal court.

198. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 164, at 223 (“Where a federal law would infringe
or abrogate existing Indian rights, courts require a clear and specific Congressional intent to
limit such rights in the general federal statute . . . In the absence of such an indication, courts
hold the federal statute inapplicable to Indian tribes.”).
199. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012)) (ending the practice of allotment of tribal lands
and restoring tribal control over local tribal affairs).
200. Congress officially ended the practice of entering into treaties with Indian nations in
1871. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 164, at 78.
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Under the Montana and Strate cases, a tribe can assert civil jurisdiction
over non-members only where (1) the non-member has a consensual
relationship with the tribe and the tribe’s regulation arises out of that
relationship, 201 or (2) the activity of the non-member “threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe.” 202
Unless the non-member in question is the pilot of tribally owned aircraft
that departs from and returns to an airport on tribal land, a court is unlikely
to conclude that entry into tribal airspace alone constitutes the requisite
consensual relationship required by Montana and Strate.
A tribe may be more successful in asserting that its jurisdictional
authority over non-members in tribal airspace is necessary to protect the
economic security or health and welfare of the tribe. However, such
arguments would need to be supported by strong and direct evidence that
non-member aviation activities adversely affect those tribal interests and
that tribal airspace regulations are required to prevent those harms from
occurring.
VI. A Proposal for Federal Acknowledgment of Tribal Sovereignty in
Airspace
Although Indian tribes may legally possess the inherent sovereign right
to regulate tribal airspace, as a practical matter the United States
government actively regulates all airspace within its borders—including
tribal airspace. 203 The regulatory aviation system created and maintained by
the United States has proven to be highly successful and effective, and
exists as the global safety standard against which other national aviation
systems are measured. 204
As discussed in Part V above, tribes would likely encounter strong
opposition to the exercise of tribal authority in airspace. Litigation in
federal court would almost certainly involve an examination of various
doctrines of federal Indian law, the interpretation of which by a federal
court could lead to an undesirable outcome for Indian tribes looking to
protect tribal skies. As with many issues affecting Indian tribes, federal
201. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981).
202. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
203. See sources cited supra note 41.
204. See Mike Hall, Report: U.S. Aviation System Safest in the World, AFL-CIO NOW
(Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Organizing-Bargaining/Report-U.S.-AviationSystem-Safest-in-the-World.
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legislation could be the key to bringing clarity to these issues by affirming
the authority of tribes to regulate at least some aspects of tribal airspace.
Given the pervasive and successful nature of federal regulation of United
States airspace, tribes may be best situated to achieve such a political
victory by emphasizing that any such regulation would occur as a close
cooperative effort between tribal officials and the FAA, with the latter in
charge of enforcing tribal air regulations.
A. Proposed Congressional Affirmation of Tribal Sovereignty in Tribal
Airspace
In an ideal world, Congress would affirm the right of tribes to control
entry into portions of tribal airspace in which air traffic poses a risk of any
adverse effect to tribal citizens or the tribal government. In acknowledging
the success of the federal regulatory regime, it could direct the FAA to
work closely with Indian tribes to create, promulgate, and enforce rules and
regulations designed to protect tribal airspace.
Congressional affirmation of inherent tribal power is not unthinkable. A
significant example is the so-called “Duro Fix,” a legislative response to the
Court’s holding in Duro v. Reina that Indian tribes had no criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians who committed crimes on a
reservation. 205 The Court’s holding created a jurisdictional void in which
non-member Indians could theoretically commit crimes on the reservations
of other tribes and escape prosecution. While the federal government still
had jurisdiction over such crimes, the lack of federal criminal resources
devoted to prosecuting on-reservation criminal actions by non-member
Indians served as a practical barrier to prosecution. 206 Thus, Congress saw
the need to affirm the right of tribes to prosecute such individuals. Its
response was swift, and resulted in amendment of the Indian Civil Rights
Act to include the following provision:
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive,
legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by
and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian
offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
205. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
206. See Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over
Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553,
564-72 (2009) (describing the various reasons that federal prosecutors are disincentivized to
prosecute crimes on Indian reservations over which they have jurisdiction).
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recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
all Indians. 207
As with the Duro Fix, Congress could affirm the inherent tribal right to
sovereignty in airspace through amendment of the Indian Civil Rights
Act. 208 The legislation would ideally define the tribal power to exclude nonmembers and affirm that such authority extends to both tribal land and
airspace. The provision could read as follows:
For purposes of this subchapter, the term—
...
(5) “power to exclude” means the recognized inherent
sovereign right of an Indian tribe to condition the presence of
any non-member Indian or non-Indian on land over which that
tribe has jurisdiction, and the right to physically exclude any
non-member Indian or non-Indian from that jurisdictional
territory entirely for any cause that the tribe deems necessary to
protect the welfare of the tribe, its members, and its resources.
This right to exclude includes the right to establish flight rules
and other conditions of entry, and extends to all navigable tribal
airspace up to ten thousand feet mean sea level (MSL).
The language in the above provision would accomplish several
objectives. First, it would make clear that Indian tribes have an interest in
the aviation activities occurring in tribal airspace. Second, it would affirm
that the power to exclude may be exercised on tribal land and in the
airspace above it. Third, it would extend the tribe’s authority to regulate
aircraft up to a reasonable level (ten thousand feet) and preserve existing
commercial, military, and private air routes at higher altitudes. 209 Fourth, it
would acknowledge that tribal governments are the entities best situated to
determine what kind of air traffic might be detrimental to the tribe.
B. Proposed Federal Aviation Regulations
Passage of legislation affirming tribal sovereignty in airspace would go
far in empowering Indian tribes to pursue better protections for tribal
207. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (emphasis added).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
209. Actual jurisdictional altitude limit would ideally be determined through a
cooperative process between Congress, the FAA, and Indian tribes. There could be
additional language that would give flexibility to individual Indian tribes and the FAA to
determine an appropriate altitude limit for the tribe’s jurisdictional reach.
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airspace. However, more would be required in order to ensure a safe
transition into the new legal paradigm. As part of the legislation, Congress
would ideally direct the FAA to consult closely with Indian tribes to
develop a new regulatory category to carry out the enforcement of tribal
airspace laws.
In creating a new regulatory scheme, the FAA would need to strike a
balance between honoring the ability of Indian tribes to exert control in
tribal airspace and protecting the integrity of United States airspace. To
accomplish this, it could create a new category of special use airspace 210
which classifies all tribal airspace below an altitude of ten thousand feet
MSL as restricted airspace.
The rules would ideally direct pilots with a need to fly below ten
thousand feet MSL in tribal airspace to obtain clearance from nearby air
traffic control (whether tribal or non-tribal) prior to entering tribal airspace.
Exceptions could be made for emergency landings and any unexpected
disruption in air traffic patterns which might necessitate the temporary
relaxing of tribal airspace flight restrictions.
To address commercial, private, or military air traffic traveling through
existing air routes, the FAA could possibly retain the right to negotiate air
easements over certain portions of tribal airspace where such airspace is
part of an established route that requires flight under ten thousand feet
MSL. The fundamental premise of the regulatory changes would be the
recognition that tribal governments share authority with the FAA to
determine what flight rules will best serve to protect tribal interests on the
ground.
The FAA might best achieve the preceding objectives by designating
airspace above tribal lands as Restricted Tribal Airspace. This new category
would fall under the Special Use category of airspace, a classification in
which special flight rules and restrictions apply. Though there are already
several existing categories of Special Use airspace, 211 the creation of the
new category will serve to put pilots on clear notice of the existence of
special flight rules in tribal airspace. The Restricted Tribal Airspace
designation and its flight rules could be communicated to pilots through the
use of FAA sectional charts and other communications. 212

210. Special use airspace is airspace in which special flight rules or restrictions apply.
See PILOT’S HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 14-3 to 14-4.
211. Id. at 14-3 to 14-4.
212. The FAA uses sectional aeronautical charts, notices to airmen (NOTAMS), and
other methods of communication to put pilots on notice of acceptable flight paths and the
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The FAA would ideally work directly with tribal governments to
determine precisely which rules should apply within each Restricted Tribal
Airspace area. The United States currently holds “[a]pproximately 56.2
million acres” in trust for Indian tribes, 213 but the geographic and
demographic features of tribal territory are unique to each tribe. 214
Therefore, it would likely be necessary to carefully create specific airspace
boundaries on a tribe-by-tribe basis.
The proposed statutory requirement that tribal airspace includes only that
land over which a tribe has jurisdiction would likely complicate this
process, as tribal objectives in regulating airspace may be frustrated by
reservation areas that were allotted and are therefore characterized by
“checkerboard” tribal jurisdiction. Such issues would need to be carefully
considered by tribes, Congress, and the FAA prior to the enactment of final
federal regulations.
VII. Conclusion
In 2009, the Hualapai Tribe successfully asserted regulatory jurisdiction
in its airspace when it fined Lionel de Antoni, a non-Indian aviation
enthusiast with no ties to the Tribe, for his unauthorized aerial trespass into
the Tribe’s airspace. Although the jurisdictional issues seemed ripe for
consideration by a federal court, the case was rendered moot when Mr. de
Antoni pled guilty in tribal court and the Tribe returned his property.
This article has examined the legal issues that likely would have been
litigated had the case moved out of tribal court and into a federal forum. It
concludes that while Indian tribes have strong legal arguments for the
assertion of tribal authority in airspace, opponents may also have a strong
basis in federal Indian law to challenge some of the core assumptions
underlying the theory of tribal sovereignty in airspace. The legislative and
regulatory solutions proposed in Part VI are intended to inspire thinking
about possible solutions to the jurisdictional and practical barriers that
tribes may face in asserting regulatory authority in airspace.
Aviation activity in the United States will likely continue to impact tribal
airspace as aviation technology evolves. As the FAA now races to catch up
rules that apply in various sections and altitudes of airspace along any given flight route. See
id. at 14-3 to 14-4.
213. Indian Affairs FAQs, supra note 160.
214. The largest tribal land base, for example, is the Navajo Nation, with a reservation
encompassing sixteen million acres across Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Id. By contrast,
there are many tribes with reservations as small as 1000 acres or less. Id.
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to innovations in commercial and recreational drone technology, 215 state
and local jurisdictions are actively testing the scope of their authority to
impose their own regulations on drone use. 216 Some Indian tribes are likely
already considering solutions under tribal law to deal with the issues that
commercial and recreational drone use are certain to create in tribal
airspace. While this article provides a foundation for such conversations,
there are no clear and decided answers at this time. What is clear is that
these issues are unlikely to be resolved in favor of tribal interests without
active political and legal engagement by Indian tribes, tribal advocates, and
policymakers.

215. Scott Shane, F.A.A. Rules Would Limit Commercial Drone Use, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/us/faa-rules-would-limit-commercial-droneuse.html.
216. Justin Peters, Chicago Becomes the First Big City to Enact Drone Regulations,
Nails Them, SLATE.COM (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/
11/20/chicago_enacts_drone_regulations_that_are_really_good.html.
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